SaaS is taking a bite out of the $18 billion IT management market. A new Forrester Research report forecasts SaaS-based IT management accounts will be 10% of the market by 2013. The reason: high level of interest from medium-sized and large enterprises. Forrester also predicts that enterprises with 1,000 or more employees will account for 50% of SaaS installations in 2009. We’ve seen this on the service desk side with the rapid growth of upstart Service-now.com. Companies are looking for easier and rapid deployment, lower upfront and capital costs and rapid time to value – all benefits of SaaS as well as our own appliance model.

IBM snapped up Transitive this week. Their QuickTransit software dynamically translates native code between architectures, enabling apps compiled for one processor to be run on another without any modification. Apple was the first licensee and used it to build Rosetta, a translation system that allowed users of Intel Macs to seamlessly run legacy PowerPC apps. IBM plans to use the technology to move workloads onto IBM systems without recompiling, allowing customers to “save on energy costs due to hardware consolidation and reduced TCO.”

At CA World, CA announced a partnership with Amazon to provide “management capabilities around Amazon’s EC2 utility computing platform, potentially including discovery of software running on EC2 instances, performance monitoring, configuration management, software deployment capabilities and provisioning”. John Willis, in spite of some pretty funny potshots and stories about CA (don’t we all have them), writes that “CA is the first of the Big Four to take the cloud serious”.

1)  Gunnar has put up his speech as the Quality of Protection Keynote:  “The Economics of Finding and Fixing Vulnerabilities in Distributed Systems.” Don’t worry if that title doesn’t turn you on, his post is one of the best this year.  I wanted to make today’s blog post some reflection on what he says there, but I haven’t the time today and we’ll have to table that until next week.  Anyway, it’s excellent.

2)  Aleks Jakulin writes about The Future of Data Analysis.  I spoke with a CSO who is morphing into a CRO role and one of the things he plans on doing is hiring about  a half dozen data analysts.  If you think better use of Security Information is in your future, you’ll want to take a look at that blog.

3)  Brent Huston of the Ohio voting machine fame writes about an incident he just worked on and risk and rational security.

4)  Our friend Mike Rothman and our friends at Business Of Security/Cisco are doing a Pragmatic CSO thing.  Mike is always entertaining and practical (dare I say, pragmatic) so I think this should be a fun webex.  Hope you’ll sign up.

Namaste Risk Geeks!

Information Week’s new blog, Plug Into the Cloud, is already in the thick of the controversy on the emerging cloud computing trend. A recent post lists a bunch of highly opinionated comments on the topic by site visitors, running the gamut from “Cloud computing is kind of like the Emperor’s New Clothes” to “cloud software can actually be more expensive than the software I load onto my hard drive.”

Jeff Doyle writes an interesting post about resistance to IPv6 adoption (what, you think we forgot?). Instead of the usual focus on IPv6 as an application issue, he points out that it’s actually an infrastructure thing. Would you wait to upgrade routers, switches, software, or servers until you can find a way to make the newer systems profitable? Would you wait to increase bandwidth only after you have customers waiting to use it? If you’ve answered these questions “no”, then why are you waiting to upgrade to IPv6?

We posted about whether or not there were recession proof products in IT yesterday. Network World Management Maven Denise Dubie also writes about readers weighing in on IT and the economy – from having to do even more with less to seeing the economic downtown as an opportunity to highlight IT’s true value to the business.

And finally, on the lighter side: What would we do without crazy billionaires and their crazy purchases? According to a New York Times article, a company controlled by Google’s top execs just added a fighter jet to their roster. “Presumably no attacks on Microsoft are planned at this time.” (image from Wikipedia)

So can open source weather out the economic storm? Emerging from the dot-com bust, open source has matured, its legal framework and values are established, and serious players are in the game. But as this post on ZDNet points out, consolidation is on the way. “IDC renamed its LinuxWorld Show in San Francisco next year Open Source World – a clear shot across the bow at O’Reilly’s OSCON.” Will open source (from free to lower-cost alternatives to commercial software) flourish in a time of tightening budgets or will projects quietly go away for lack of funding (VC and that pesky business model thing) and, let’s face it, the “extra time” of IT pros tasked yet again to do more with less?

It’s October 2008 and Charles Babcock writes, “CA Embraces Virtualization As Future of Data Center Management”. Beyond keeping up with what competitors are doing, I enjoy this article for the masterful way it depicts the nightmare that is working with traditional frameworks. Too slow, too expensive, too complex, too many modules – it’s all in here. And somehow, I don’t think that was the point of it. So, $154,000 for CA Data Center Automation Manager – which can “consult” the CA CMDB (pricing starting at what do you think, something like $500K to a million – don’t forget those services) plus CA Wily APM (Introscope 8 and Wily Customer Experience Manager 4.2; pricing anyone?) metrics that get fed back into Data Center Automation Manager to help determine the virtual machine resources that are needed. Plus can also integrate info from CA Endeavor’s software change management tracking and CA SysView and in future with CA Management Suite for Mainframe Linux, potentially. I am not kidding about this list. And, we’ve been hearing this for a while – “Unicenter” the brand goes away and is replaced by “CA NSM”. The brand goes away. Why retire a successful brand? Ah.

I love this post on EMC, “Eleven Things You Didn’t Know About the World’s Largest External Disk Storage Company.” Although I guess I really don’t know much about Joe Tucci, since #11 says:

“Contrary to conventional thought, it is not true that the EMC President/CEO is the older, gentler brother of the fictional patriarch of HBO’s hit television series.” Hunh. I just googled him, thinking maybe it was a resemblance thing. Nope."

And on a much lighter note. A funny from Dell. 2 years later, I just stumbled across this Proprietaryville , Jibjab-ish video, called Dell the Journey. Legacy systems being escorted onto the Retirement Home bus. Michael Dell as knight in shining armor, singing no less. Joe Tucci and Larry Ellison showing up as heroes leading the charge against Proprietaryville (yes, funny in and of itself). And my favorite, “Now let’s go kick some proprietary apps.”

Conventional wisdom holds that terrorism is inherently political, and that people become terrorists for political reasons. This is the "strategic" model of terrorism, and it's basically an economic model. It posits that people resort to terrorism when they believe -- rightly or wrongly -- that terrorism is worth it; that is, when they believe the political gains of terrorism minus the political costs are greater than if they engaged in some other, more peaceful form of protest. It's assumed, for example, that people join Hamas to achieve a Palestinian state; that people join the PKK to attain a Kurdish national homeland; and that people join al-Qaida to, among other things, get the United States out of the Persian Gulf.

If you believe this model, the way to fight terrorism is to change that equation, and that's what most experts advocate. Governments tend to minimize the political gains of terrorism through a no-concessions policy; the international community tends to recommend reducing the political grievances of terrorists via appeasement, in hopes of getting them to renounce violence. Both advocate policies to provide effective nonviolent alternatives, like free elections.

Historically, none of these solutions has worked with any regularity. Max Abrahms, a predoctoral fellow at Stanford University's Center for International Security and Cooperation, has studied dozens of terrorist groups from all over the world. He argues that the model is wrong. In a paper published this year in International Security that -- sadly -- doesn't have the title "Seven Habits of Highly Ineffective Terrorists," he discusses, well, seven habits of highly ineffective terrorists. These seven tendencies are seen in terrorist organizations all over the world, and they directly contradict the theory that terrorists are political maximizers:

Terrorists, he writes, (1) attack civilians, a policy that has a lousy track record of convincing those civilians to give the terrorists what they want; (2) treat terrorism as a first resort, not a last resort, failing to embrace nonviolent alternatives like elections; (3) don't compromise with their target country, even when those compromises are in their best interest politically; (4) have protean political platforms, which regularly, and sometimes radically, change; (5) often engage in anonymous attacks, which precludes the target countries making political concessions to them; (6) regularly attack other terrorist groups with the same political platform; and (7) resist disbanding, even when they consistently fail to achieve their political objectives or when their stated political objectives have been achieved.

Abrahms has an alternative model to explain all this: People turn to terrorism for social solidarity. He theorizes that people join terrorist organizations worldwide in order to be part of a community, much like the reason inner-city youths join gangs in the United States.

The evidence supports this. Individual terrorists often have no prior involvement with a group's political agenda, and often join multiple terrorist groups with incompatible platforms. Individuals who join terrorist groups are frequently not oppressed in any way, and often can't describe the political goals of their organizations. People who join terrorist groups most often have friends or relatives who are members of the group, and the great majority of terrorist are socially isolated: unmarried young men or widowed women who weren't working prior to joining. These things are true for members of terrorist groups as diverse as the IRA and al-Qaida.

For example, several of the 9/11 hijackers planned to fight in Chechnya, but they didn't have the right paperwork so they attacked America instead. The mujahedeen had no idea whom they would attack after the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan, so they sat around until they came up with a new enemy: America. Pakistani terrorists regularly defect to another terrorist group with a totally different political platform. Many new al-Qaida members say, unconvincingly, that they decided to become a jihadist after reading an extreme, anti-American blog, or after converting to Islam, sometimes just a few weeks before. These people know little about politics or Islam, and they frankly don't even seem to care much about learning more. The blogs they turn to don't have a lot of substance in these areas, even though more informative blogs do exist.

All of this explains the seven habits. It's not that they're ineffective; it's that they have a different goal. They might not be effective politically, but they are effective socially: They all help preserve the group's existence and cohesion.

This kind of analysis isn't just theoretical; it has practical implications for counterterrorism. Not only can we now better understand who is likely to become a terrorist, we can engage in strategies specifically designed to weaken the social bonds within terrorist organizations. Driving a wedge between group members -- commuting prison sentences in exchange for actionable intelligence, planting more double agents within terrorist groups -- will go a long way to weakening the social bonds within those groups.

We also need to pay more attention to the socially marginalized than to the politically downtrodden, like unassimilated communities in Western countries. We need to support vibrant, benign communities and organizations as alternative ways for potential terrorists to get the social cohesion they need. And finally, we need to minimize collateral damage in our counterterrorism operations, as well as clamping down on bigotry and hate crimes, which just creates more dislocation and social isolation, and the inevitable calls for revenge.

This essay previously appeared on Wired.com.

I’m sure you already know about the other “network management” – where ISPs and carriers get their hands publicly slapped for limiting bandwidth to high-traffic offenders. But when is this kind of “network management” a good thing? At a panel sponsored by the FCC in DC, reps from carriers and ISPs discussed what steps they’ve been taking to prepare for a pandemic or other major global crisis – that would force workers to stay at home or work from more remote locations to limit exposure.

Are people paying attention to ICANN? They’re saying that IPv4 will be fully allocated in the next two or three years. Does anyone care? In their bid to make people care, ICANN talks about the state of IPv6 adoption and touts Africa as the most rapid adopter.

SOA soon part of the ‘cloud’? No, please no.

Microsoft – The Silver Lining in Every Cloud. Joe Wilcox over at eWeek’s Microsoft Watch, has been following Steve Ballmer around and collecting some nice quotes on how the company is transitioning. “For many years, we had kind of what I would call the all-encompassing mission, vision and scorecard statement: a computer on every desk and in every home. …Well, our footprint and portfolio is broader than that. “ [In every hand and of course, in every cloud…] “So, as a vision statement we talk about creating seamless experiences that combine the magic of software, the power of the Internet across a world of devices.” The magic of software – something I haven’t thought about for a while. And:

“You need a real platform in the cloud. When we wanted to go after the PC, we built an operating system. When we wanted to go after the phone, we built an operating system. When we wanted to go after the enterprise, we built an operating system. We’ll announce a new operating system, one that runs in the cloud and has a wide variety of capabilities.”

Conventional wisdom holds that terrorism is inherently political, and that people become terrorists for political reasons. This is the "strategic" model of terrorism, and it's basically an economic model. It posits that people resort to terrorism when they believe -- rightly or wrongly -- that terrorism is worth it; that is, when they believe the political gains of terrorism minus the political costs are greater than if they engaged in some other, more peaceful form of protest. It's assumed, for example, that people join Hamas to achieve a Palestinian state; that people join the PKK to attain a Kurdish national homeland; and that people join al-Qaida to, among other things, get the United States out of the Persian Gulf.

If you believe this model, the way to fight terrorism is to change that equation, and that's what most experts advocate. Governments tend to minimize the political gains of terrorism through a no-concessions policy; the international community tends to recommend reducing the political grievances of terrorists via appeasement, in hopes of getting them to renounce violence. Both advocate policies to provide effective nonviolent alternatives, like free elections.

Historically, none of these solutions has worked with any regularity. Max Abrahms, a predoctoral fellow at Stanford University's Center for International Security and Cooperation, has studied dozens of terrorist groups from all over the world. He argues that the model is wrong. In a paper (.pdf) published this year in International Security that -- sadly -- doesn't have the title "Seven Habits of Highly Ineffective Terrorists," he discusses, well, seven habits of highly ineffective terrorists. These seven tendencies are seen in terrorist organizations all over the world, and they directly contradict the theory that terrorists are political maximizers:

Terrorists, he writes, (1) attack civilians, a policy that has a lousy track record of convincing those civilians to give the terrorists what they want; (2) treat terrorism as a first resort, not a last resort, failing to embrace nonviolent alternatives like elections; (3) don't compromise with their target country, even when those compromises are in their best interest politically; (4) have protean political platforms, which regularly, and sometimes radically, change; (5) often engage in anonymous attacks, which precludes the target countries making political concessions to them; (6) regularly attack other terrorist groups with the same political platform; and (7) resist disbanding, even when they consistently fail to achieve their political objectives or when their stated political objectives have been achieved.

Abrahms has an alternative model to explain all this: People turn to terrorism for social solidarity. He theorizes that people join terrorist organizations worldwide in order to be part of a community, much like the reason inner-city youths join gangs in the United States.

The evidence supports this. Individual terrorists often have no prior involvement with a group's political agenda, and often join multiple terrorist groups with incompatible platforms. Individuals who join terrorist groups are frequently not oppressed in any way, and often can't describe the political goals of their organizations. People who join terrorist groups most often have friends or relatives who are members of the group, and the great majority of terrorist are socially isolated: unmarried young men or widowed women who weren't working prior to joining. These things are true for members of terrorist groups as diverse as the IRA and al-Qaida.

For example, several of the 9/11 hijackers planned to fight in Chechnya, but they didn't have the right paperwork so they attacked America instead. The mujahedeen had no idea whom they would attack after the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan, so they sat around until they came up with a new enemy: America. Pakistani terrorists regularly defect to another terrorist group with a totally different political platform. Many new al-Qaida members say, unconvincingly, that they decided to become a jihadist after reading an extreme, anti-American blog, or after converting to Islam, sometimes just a few weeks before. These people know little about politics or Islam, and they frankly don't even seem to care much about learning more. The blogs they turn to don't have a lot of substance in these areas, even though more informative blogs do exist.

All of this explains the seven habits. It's not that they're ineffective; it's that they have a different goal. They might not be effective politically, but they are effective socially: They all help preserve the group's existence and cohesion.

This kind of analysis isn't just theoretical; it has practical implications for counterterrorism. Not only can we now better understand who is likely to become a terrorist, we can engage in strategies specifically designed to weaken the social bonds within terrorist organizations. Driving a wedge between group members -- commuting prison sentences in exchange for actionable intelligence, planting more double agents within terrorist groups -- will go a long way to weakening the social bonds within those groups.

We also need to pay more attention to the socially marginalized than to the politically downtrodden, like unassimilated communities in Western countries. We need to support vibrant, benign communities and organizations as alternative ways for potential terrorists to get the social cohesion they need. And finally, we need to minimize collateral damage in our counterterrorism operations, as well as clamping down on bigotry and hate crimes, which just creates more dislocation and social isolation, and the inevitable calls for revenge.

---

Bruce Schneier is Chief Security Technology Officer of BT, and author of Beyond Fear: Thinking Sensibly About Security in an Uncertain World.

I’d love to have another blog even more specific - “Ok, that Assurance is Evidence Of What, Exactly?

Today he has a great article called:

What’s the matter with Risk Management?

And “in short, it’s everything.” It pretty much sums up why I had to grow to re-evaluate how our industry does risk, risk management, approaches controls & vulnerability and find a new way.   A couple of things jump out at me in reading Chris’ article:

1.)  Just because that Deming cycle sucks and is full of unknowns doesn’t mean “risk” doesn’t exist, nor that it isn’t of primary importance. Nor does it mean that in the absence of model & methodology, we won’t be “doing” risk analysis anyway - just in an ad hoc method and completely from “the gut”.

Our industry calls these unstructured risk analysis “Best Practices”, as it’s an easy and convenient way of sweeping the unknowns under the rug of bureaucracy and enforcing it via peer pressure.

2.)  What this “suckiness” does mean is that your model and methodology aren’t helping you. As Chris intimates, there is too much uncertainty in the inputs for his model (they are, in the language of Bayesians - too subjective to be useful priors).

Take for example how we might be approaching the “controls” part of our analysis.  Chris writes:

“2. What are the controls that we have to employ?
800-53, ISO 27001, PCI, etc.

Still kinda good, but we basically know that ISO is relatively voluntary and NIST supplies a control catalog and not policies. So here we have to take the control catalog, and mash our policies into it.”

I wouldn’t call this “kinda good” at all :)  These control catalogs only provide a hierarchy within which to look for evidence of  our ability to resist an attacker.  They are incapable of making any claim about the effectiveness of the controls when they are operated at 100% efficiency, or more importantly, what % efficiency our specific organization operates at.

Let’s use Chris Hayes’ Initech as our fictional example.

Initech has a control (a back door on a loading dock).  Now the locks on the door are 100% capable of locking the door.  This is different than saying that they are capable of frustrating all but the top 5% of lockpicking burgalars.  It is also diffferent than saying that in a sample of several “walk around audits” the doors are left open 20% of the time (they are not in compliance with policy 100% of the time).  Even worse, that 80% of the time the door is not propped open?  Yeah, tailgating is a known issue.

So we have several different variables here that we need to account for (and it’s just a door).  But the analogy stands that most “risk management” methodologies are “We have a door, yes/no?” And most GRC platforms, when asked for their “opinion” will simply say “door is needed” or, even worse, “a door policy is needed”.

3.)  Criticality and the Source of Value is all messed up in these Risk Management models.

Chris writes:

Someone wants me to tell them which boxes are more critical than others. This is mainly because of budgetary or operational reasons. To which I usually say “All of them, it is a system after all”.

This literally made me laugh out loud.  And this sort of “rate the firewall as Risk = 500 but rate the actual business application as Risk = 157″ thing is also endemic.  Now Chris is very smart here.  He correctly identifies that the value is tied to the business process the systems support, and not to a specific box.  Oh, we scan at the specific box level - but because of the nature of systemic failures - all the boxes in the process are inexorably interrelated.

One of the reasons I really like FAIR is that the losses are quantified (or qualified) based not on some amorphous value of the box or the process itself, but losses are linked to the actions that the threat will take. Take systems in a highly regulated industries as an example.  Usually the most probable losses aren’t due to system compromise per se, but in the disclosure the compromise causes (regulators are a threat source, after all).  But many “risk management” methodologies will say “online banking is worth $2 billion, the value of the systems is therefore $2 billion”.  And suddenly we’re telling executive management that there’s a 60% probability that they’ll lose $2 billion.

4.)  If the primary source of prior information for your “risk management” methodology is a vulnerability scanner - you’re doing it wrong.  Chris writes:

So we ran a scan and now we have a report. A snapshot in time to make all decisions. Where did these vulnerability ratings come from? Do I even know if my system is at risk? What if I spend my time on vulnerabilities that have no threat?

So first, my thoughts are that actual “vulnerability” must be a comparison of the force a threat can apply, and our ability to resist that force (this is a probability statement, btw).

Changing your thinking about vulnerability now helps us understand the problem in several new ways.  First, you can start to divorce yourself from the scanner.  After all, the scanner is simply providing you with current state information that is usually just relevant variance from policy. It doesn’t really tell you about real “weakness in a system” because the system is an interrelated mess of people, processes and IT assets.

5.)  Finally, most “risk management” approaches just *don’t* do a good job of helping us understand the how’s and why’s of managing risk. In the past, I’ve referred to these standards as really being “issue management” because they are at their heart, an act of discovery - a formal process around gathering prior information.  They are not, in and of themselves, capable of linking the issues discovered to the root cause.  And these root causes?  Yeah, they’re the things that create “risk”.  Not a threat, not a vulnerability, not the existence of an asset - the amount of risk that we have stems from our capability to manage it.

So Chris, I completely agree - but I wouldn’t give up yet.  There actually are a few of us who are focused on what you suggest:

Where to go from here: A fundamental revamp of how to deal with Risk. Where risk professionals focus on the treating the sickness and not the symptoms, and come up with some new success/actionable metrics.

Chris, there’s nothing I want to do more than that.

Baltimore is one of what I believe are still three test markets that will go into commercial availability, albeit as much as a year after initial plans, and then months delayed after revised plans were announced. Still 2 to 4 Mbps is far above the level that current cell technology can achieve as a consistent range.