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Phishing Holes

2008-04-03 21:39:00 by sdl in The Security Development Lifecycle
 
...aspx?p=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.somebank.com%2Flogin.aspx If you answered www.somebank.com/welcome.aspx, youre right. But if you answered www.somebank.com/login.aspx, youre also right. How can both of these be true? Because the page www.somebank.com/welcome.aspx redirects the user to whatever location is specified in the p parameter of the...
 
 
 
 
 
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209.1 Host Locked

The Article has images
2007-12-18 17:56:28 by HASH0x8713b3c in Dancho Danchev's Blog - Mind Streams of Information Security Knowledge
...aspx natwest.com. tx40.hk /onlinebanking/customerform.aspx natwest.com. tx48.hk /onlinebanking/customerform.aspx natwest.com. tx15.hk /onlinebanking/customerform.aspx natwest.com. tx47.hk /onlinebanking/customerform.aspx natwest.com. tx40.hk /onlinebanking/customerform.aspx natwest.com. iyeufv.org.ph /onlinebanking/customerform.aspx...
 
 
 
 
 
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Orkut XSS Worm

2007-12-20 16:18:37 by RSnake in ha.ckers.org web application security lab
 
...aspx?cmm=44001818 HTTP/1.1 Host: www.orkut.com User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; en-US; rv:1.8.1.11) Gecko/20071127 Firefox/2.0.0.11 Accept: text/xml,application/xml,application/xhtml+xml,text/html;q=0.9,text/plain;q=0.8,image/png,*/*;q=0.5 Accept-Language: en-us,en;q=0.5 Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate Accept-Charset:...
 
 
 
 
 
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Fuzz Testing at Microsoft and the Triage Process

2007-09-20 18:52:00 by sdl in The Security Development Lifecycle
 
...aspx The Animated Cursor bug caused us to revisit our mini-debugger. Why? Put simply, we hadn't introduced the "bucketization" and classification mechanisms for first-chance exceptions. Naturally, this meant the tester was back to square one in terms of having no assistance on the labor-intensive triaging process. To deal with the "recover...
 
 
 
 
 
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Massive RealPlayer Exploit Embedded Attack

The Article has images
2008-01-07 18:58:52 by HASH0x89c7e1c in Dancho Danchev's Blog - Mind Streams of Information Security Knowledge
...aspx (61.188.39.218) which says " Hello ", furthermore, c.uc8010.com/0/w.js loads c.uc8010.com/1.htm ; count38.51yes.com/click.aspx?id=389925362&logo=1 and s106.cnzz.com/stat.php?id=742266&web id=742266 The internal structure is as follows c.uc8010.com/1.htm - attempts MDAC ActiveX code execution (CVE-2006-0003) in between the following...
 
 
 
 
 
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Voting For Transparent Communication

2008-03-28 15:03:00 by sdl in The Security Development Lifecycle
 
...aspx , we like to talk to them on two important levels. The first is technical: what did they find, and can they help us reproduce it? The second is logistical: what's their timeline for disclosing a vulnerability, and how can we all work together to release guidance or protection for customers? Ideally, we do that in concert with the...
 
 
 
 
 
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Zango's in your Face(book)

2008-01-03 21:23:00 by Russ McRee in HolisticInfoSec.org
 
...aspx http://te1.zango.com/te.aspx Registy Keys HKEY CURRENT USERSoftwareZangoInstall HKEY CURRENT USERSoftwareZangoDebugSettings softwaredistributionfaild HKEY LOCAL MACHINESoftwareMediaGateway SoftwareList hkey local machinesoftwareseekmo hkey local machinesoftwarezango softwareurl: %s, registry: %s GetSoftwareList The software you are...
 
 
 
 
 
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Ask the Auditor: Who is Responsible for Information Security?

2007-12-29 06:24:50 by Editor in Security Links
 
Our new column, Ask the Auditor, answers real questions submitted by real readers. This week, certified internal auditor and certified information systems auditor Dan Swanson answers the question of who is responsible for information security By Dan Swanson A Reader Asks: Who is responsible for information security The Auditor Responds: In...
 
 
 
 
 
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The Trouble with Threat Modeling

2007-09-26 19:11:00 by sdl in The Security Development Lifecycle
 
...aspx One thing that was realized very early on is that our early efforts at threat modeling were quite ad-hoc. We sat in a room and said "Hmm, what might the bad guys do to attack our product?" It turns out that this isn't actually a BAD way of going about threat modeling, and if that's all you do, you're way better off than you were if...
 
 
 
 
 
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NAP case study published

2008-02-01 11:50:25 by Steve Riley in Steve Riley on Security
 
...aspx?casestudyid=4000001286 . It's a quick read. Glad to see they chose to use IPsec-based enforcement, it's my favorite